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Abstract
We characterize the product line choice and pricing of a monopolist from the upper envelope
of net marginal revenue curves to the individual product demand functions. The equilibrium
product line constitutes those varieties yielding the highest upper envelope. In a generalized ver-
tical differentiation framework, the equilibrium line is exactly the same as the first-best socially
optimal line. These upper envelope and first-best optimal line findings extend to symmetric
Cournot oligopoly.
Keywords: Product line design, product differentiation, second-degree price discrimination,
product line pricing, Cournot multi-product competition.
JEL classification: L12, L13, L15.
∗We thank participants at the Berlin IO Day (March, 2014) for comments. In particular, thanks to Mark Armstrong
for alerting us to the work of Itoh (1983) and to the recent work of Johnson and Myatt (2014). We also express
gratitude to David Myatt, Justin Johnson, an Associate Editor and three anonymous referees at the Journal of
Economic Theory for extremely helpful comments and suggestions. Fang Guo provided excellent research assistance.
Simon Anderson thanks the NSF for support. Levent Celik thanks the Czech Science Foundation for support (GACR
#15-22540S). All errors are our own.
†Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, U.S.A. (email: sa9w@virginia.edu).
‡National Research University Higher School of Economics, Myasnitskaya 20, 101000, Moscow, Russia; and
CERGE-EI (a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of
the Czech Republic), Prague, Czech Republic (e-mail: lcelik@hse.ru).
1 Introduction
Economic analysis typically describes single-product firms even though almost all actual firms
offer many varieties in the same product class. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we provide a
surprisingly simple characterization of the pricing of a monopolist’s product line using marginal
revenue curves. The monopolist prices its product line (and segments consumers) following the
upper envelope of marginal revenue curves to the individual product demand functions. This
pricing characterization determines the varieties to include in a product line as those in the upper
envelope of marginal revenue.
Second, we show that, in the general Mussa-Rosen (1978) vertical differentiation framework, the
equilibrium product range is the same as the first-best socially optimal range. This is because the
upper envelope of demands corresponds exactly with the upper envelope of marginal revenues, even
though the sets of consumers assigned to each variant can be quite different at the two solutions.
Our main monopoly results extend cleanly to a symmetric Cournot oligopoly.
Our analysis builds on Itoh (1983) and Johnson and Myatt (2003, 2006), and it complements
Johnson and Myatt (2014).1 Itoh (1983) analyzes the effects on product prices of introducing a new
variety in a standard Mussa-Rosen framework. We provide a simpler derivation of his results while
extending them to more general preferences. To do so, we deploy an “upgrades” approach (which
was implicit in the work of Itoh), whereby a product variety can be seen as a base product plus
a series of upgrades corresponding to each additional higher quality variant in the range. Then,
each upgrade can be associated to a price premium. Such an upgrades approach was pioneered by
Johnson and Myatt (2003), who emphasized its usefulness in analyzing product line and pricing
choices of multi-product firms in monopoly and Cournot duopoly (incumbent-entrant) contexts.
Johnson and Myatt (2006) used the same approach to characterize product line choices for an
n-firm multi-product Cournot oligopoly.
Mussa and Rosen (1978) recognized that the monopolist sets the net marginal revenue of each
upgrade to zero: “the optimal assignment equates the marginal cost and marginal revenue of
increments of quality” (1978, p.311).2 We implement this insight in our graphical treatment of
the monopolist’s solution by noting that setting the net marginal revenue of a quality increment
1We also contribute to the resurgent research interest in price discrimination (e.g., Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers,
2010, Anderson and Dana, 2009, and Armstrong, 2013). See Armstrong (2006) for a survey of recent studies.
2We thank a referee for this quote and for a very perceptive take on the literature, on which we have drawn heavily.
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to zero is equivalent to setting the net marginal revenue of adjacent qualities equal. This means
that equilibrium prices can be identified from the intersections of the net marginal revenue curves,
which implies that the equilibrium product line is determined from the upper envelope of the net
marginal revenue curves: a variant with a dominated net marginal revenue will not be used.
Johnson and Myatt (2014) clarify some of Itoh’s results and extend them to Cournot oligopoly,
engaging the set-up in Johnson and Myatt (2003, 2006). In particular, they highlight Itoh’s finding
that the price of each variety is set equal to its stand-alone profit-maximizing price when the
individual demand curves are ρ-linear. They then show that this property extends to Cournot
oligopoly. They also show that equilibrium prices are often close to prices in stand-alone single
product markets under other reasonable specifications. We draw heavily on their insights on the
“upgrades” approach and on how to carry over the monopoly results to symmetric oligopoly. We
also deliver, for both monopoly and Cournot oligopoly, a welfare equivalence between market and
socially optimal provision of varieties for a general class of Mussa-Rosen preferences.
2 Model
Consider a single firm (M) with a set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of possible variants to offer. There is a
unit mass of consumers. Each will buy at most one unit of the product, choosing the variant that
yields the greatest positive utility (otherwise, she does not purchase). M’s problem is to determine
the variants to offer and their prices, under the constraint that consumers self-select. We rule out
weakly dominated variants: those with no sales are excluded from the product line.
We describe each consumer by a taste θ, distributed over [0, 1] according to a twice differentiable
c.d.f. F (·), and a corresponding willingness-to-pay ui (θ) for variety i ∈ N . We order consumers
such that u′i (θ) > 0 for all i ∈ N ; i.e., if consumer θ has a higher willingness-to-pay for variety i
than consumer θ′, then she has a higher willingness-to-pay for all other varieties as well.
We call Pi (q) = ui
(
F−1 (1− q)) the conditional stand-alone inverse demand functions. Here,
Pi (q) is the price that leaves the consumer with a taste θ = F
−1 (1− q) indifferent between buying
and not. We label potential varieties so that a lower index implies a higher Pi (0) (this means that
the consumer θ = 1 likes 1 best and n the least, etc.) Thus the inverse demand curves are ranked
and labeled by their vertical intercepts.
We will impose the following single-crossing condition: for any two varieties i and j, Pi (q) −
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Pj (q) is monotonic in q. Hence, if Pi (q) crosses Pj (q) from above, and both varieties are commonly
priced below the intersection price, then all consumers right of the intersection would buy j over i,
and consumers left of the intersection would buy i over j. Define by MRi (q) the marginal revenue
curve to the inverse demand curve Pi (q):
MRi (q) = Pi (q) + qP
′
i (q) .
Assume that each inverse demand curve Pi (q) is strictly (−1)-concave to ensure that the corre-
sponding MRi (q) is strictly downward sloping when MRi (q) ≥ 0. We also assume that any two
MR curves can intersect at most once, and that MRi (1) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N (so that M does not serve
the whole market). We assume zero production costs: the analysis readily extends to asymmetric
constant marginal costs, rephrased in terms of net demand and net marginal revenue curves (see
the CEPR Working Paper for details).
This setup covers a wide range of preferences, including Mussa-Rosen and many others. For
instance, Itoh (1983) and Johnson and Myatt (2014) use a multiplicative specification ui (θ) = siθ,
where si is naturally interpreted as the quality of variety i as per Mussa and Rosen (1978). Then
M faces a (stand-alone) demand 1− F (p/si) at a price p. Inverting this for p gives the maximum
price M can charge to sell q units of variety i as Pi (q) = siF
−1 (1− q), so inverse demands are
multiplicative shifts. Our base specification does not require multiplicative preferences.
We now turn to determination of the equilibrium product line. We define quantities cumulatively
and denote by qj the cumulative amount of varieties 1, ..., j sold. In other words, q1 is the quantity
sold of variety 1 only, q2 is q1 plus the quantity sold of variety 2, q3 is q2 plus the quantity sold
of variety 3, and so on. Thus, when M charges pi for variety i and all varieties are consumed in
strictly positive quantities, M’s profit is
pi = p1q1 + p2 (q2 − q1) + ...+ pn (qn − qn−1) .
We can alternatively rewrite pi as
pi = (p1 − p2) q1 + (p2 − p3) q2 + ...+ pnqn.
Here we can think of variety n as the base product that all served consumers buy at pn. Variety
n − 1 is an upgrade purchased at a premium pn−1 − pn by all but the last bracket of consumers,
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etc. Implicit in Itoh (1983), this “upgrades” approach to product line determination was first
crystallized by Johnson and Myatt (2003).
Prices that support the cumulative quantities must obey n incentive compatibility constraints,
which define the switch-points q1, q2, ..., qn. Namely, q1, ..., qn−1 must satisfy the surplus equality:
Pi (qi)− pi = Pi+1 (qi)− pi+1, for i = 1, ..., n− 1. (1)
Hence, the q1 highest consumer types get more surplus from variety 1 than variety 2 while the
consumer corresponding to q1 is indifferent between the two, and so on up to variety n − 1. The
last constraint says that the final qn − qn−1 consumers should prefer variety n to non-purchase,
with the consumer at qn being indifferent:
Pn (qn)− pn = 0. (2)
These constraints enable us to uncover the key structure of the problem and envisage its simple
solution. Incorporating them into the profit function, we are back to quantities:
pi = (P1 (q1)− P2 (q1)) q1 + (P2 (q2)− P3 (q2)) q2 + · · ·+ Pn (qn) qn. (3)
Thus, quantities enter the profit function additively in separate terms. The choice of qn max-
imizes base profits earned on all consumers served, the choice of qn−1 maximizes the incremental
profits earned on those who purchase the first upgrade, and so on. At any interior solution, using
the marginal revenue notation, we reach the following n first-order conditions:
MRi (qi) = MRi+1 (qi) , for i = 1, ..., n− 1, (4)
MRn (qn) = 0. (5)
This is a remarkably simple and intuitive characterization of a monopolist’s pricing problem of
its product line. Graphically, it suffices to find where the marginal revenue curves cross to determine
the quantities, with the last crossing at zero determining the total number of consumers served.
The prices that support these quantities are given by the incentive compatibility constraints. First,
given qn, constraint (2) determines the price on variety n, pn = Pn (qn): this price depends on
no other variety. The knowledge of pn together with qn−1 then gives, via constraint (1), the price
premium pn−1 − pn = Pn−1 (qn−1) − Pn (qn). This process is repeated for the remaining prices.
Figure 1 illustrates for n = 3.
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Figure 1
Equilibrium as the intersection of MR curves and 
recursive determination of prices (n=3)
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If two successive equations in the above system (say, ith and (i+ 1)st) produce an outcome
qi ≥ qi+1, then variety i + 1 will not be offered in equilibrium. Graphically, this happens when
MRi+1 is not part of the upper envelope. Thus, for all n varieties to be offered in strictly positive
quantities in equilibrium, each MRi must be the highest MR curve for some interior quantity. Put
differently, M will pick its product line according to the upper envelope of the marginal revenue
curves. We summarize these in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 M will include variety i ∈ N in its product line if and only if
MRi (q) > max
j 6=i
MRj (q) for some q ∈
(
0,MR−1i (0)
)
.
Relabeling the set of varieties included in the product line as N∗ = {1, 2, ..., n∗}, M will choose
quantities by MRn∗ (qn∗) = 0, and MRi (qi) = MRi+1 (qi), for i = 1, ..., n
∗ − 1. The corresponding
net prices will be given by the following recursive system:
pn∗ = Pn∗ (qn∗) , and pi = pi+1 + Pi (qi)− Pi+1 (qi) , for i = 1, ..., n∗ − 1.
Notice that the first-order condition captured by the marginal revenue equality is interpreted
as a switch of a marginal consumer from variety i+ 1 to variety i. The choice of qi holds constant
all other switch-points so that a one unit increase in qi means a one unit increase in production
of variety i and a corresponding one unit decrease in production of variety i+ 1 (in order to keep
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the marginal consumer qi+1 fixed). With this in mind, the intuition for the marginal revenue
equality at the switch-point is the following. The value to M of getting a marginal consumer to
switch up from variety i + 1 to variety i is the premium pi − pi+1. But to induce this switch, M
must raise the consumer’s surplus on variety i by enough. The derivative of the willingness-to-pay
difference, P ′i (qi)−P ′i+1 (qi), indicates how much the premium must be reduced, and this premium
reduction is suffered on M’s demand base, qi, of consumers buying varieties better than i. Pulling
this together, the first-order profit derivative is pi− pi+1 +
(
P ′i (qi)− P ′i+1 (qi)
)
qi, which rearranges
to the difference in net marginal revenues at qi.
A key property of equilibrium is that price and the quantity sold of an included variety i ∈ N∗
depend only on the varieties that come after it on the product line. Itoh (1983) showed this
in a Mussa-Rosen setting with multiplicative preferences, which Johnson and Myatt (2014) later
extended for a Cournot oligopoly. Using a graphical analysis, we are able to replicate most of
Itoh’s results. Moreover, our approach is more general as we represent each variety by a general
stand-alone inverse demand function, which admits the Mussa-Rosen model as a special case.
Suppose M initially includes each one of the n varieties in its product line, and that there is
a new variety called “variety j.5” whose MR curve expands the upper envelope in the proximity
where MRj and MRj+1 intersect. Using Proposition 1, we can summarize the effects of introducing
variety j.5 into the product line as follows: (i) quantities q1, ..., qj−1, qj+1, ..., qn remain unaffected
since these are determined by local MR curves that do not involve MRj.5. The quantities sold
of varieties j and j + 1 (qj.5 − qj and qj+1 − qj.5 respectively) go down; (ii) prices pj+1, ..., pn also
remain unaffected; (iii) Suppose pj changes by an amount ∆. Then p1, ..., pj−1 change in the same
direction, also by ∆. These effects are illustrated in Figure 2 where M starts with three existing
varieties, and the new variety comes in between varieties 2 and 3. Note that the area under the
upper envelope of the MR curves measures M’s profits. Therefore, the shaded area indicates the
increase in M’s profit as a result of introducing variety 2.5.
Itoh (1983) finds that addition of a new variety will improve consumer surplus for ρ-linear and
ρ-concave demand curves. Since profits must be higher if the firm has chosen to introduce a new
variety, aggregate welfare must improve as well. In the next section, we consider quite a different
welfare link between optimum and equilibrium, by looking at the first-best optimum product line.
This involves quite a different allocation of consumers to varieties than the equilibrium with its
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Figure 2
Extra profit and output effects of a new variety
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monopoly pricing. Nonetheless, we show an equivalence result for the whole class of general Mussa-
Rosen preferences (and therefore for the Itoh, 1983, and Johnson-Myatt, 2014, models).
3 Socially optimal product line
Given our assumption of zero production costs, the socially optimal matching of consumers to
varieties follows the upper envelope of the inverse demand curves. Since this will typically differ from
the way M will segment the market, the equilibrium outcome will be associated with consumption
inefficiencies. For instance, while it is socially optimal that all consumers left of the intersection
of P1 (q) and P2 (q) consume variety 1, only those left of the intersection of MR1 (q) and MR2 (q)
consume it in equilibrium.
We will here focus on a particular class of inverse demand curves:
Pi (q) = αi − βiη (q) , (6)
where each variety i ∈ N is described by a pair (αi, βi) >> 0, and a function η (q) with η′ (q) > 0.
Without any loss of generality, set η (0) = 0. This class of demand curves is widely used in
economics. For example, η (q) = qρ means that the (direct) demand curve is ρ-linear. It also
represents a general class of Mussa-Rosen preferences. Take, for instance, ui = siv (θ) where
v′ (θ) > 0. This translates into a net inverse demand curve Pi (q) = siv
(
F−1 (1− q)), which can be
rewritten as Pi (q) = siv (1)− si
[
v (1)− v (F−1 (1− q))]. With this formulation, αi = siv (1) > 0,
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βi = si > 0, and η (q) = v (1)− v
(
F−1 (1− q)) with η′ (q) > 0.
Lemma 1 shows an important property of this class of inverse demand curves.
Lemma 1 Assume Pi (q) = αi−βiη (q), ∀i ∈ N , where (αi, βi) >> 0, η (0) = 0 and η′ (q) > 0. For
any two varieties i, j ∈ N , if Pi (q) = Pj (q) = φ > 0 at some q > 0, then MRi (q˜) = MRj (q˜) = φ
for some q˜ ∈ (0, q). Similarly, if MRi (q˜) = MRj (q˜) = φ > 0 at some q˜ > 0, then Pi (q) = Pj (q) =
φ for some q > q˜.
Lemma 1 says that two inverse demand curves cross if and only if their corresponding marginal
revenue curves cross. Moreover, both of these crossings occur at the same height. This has an
important implication: if a particular variety is part of the upper envelope of the marginal revenue
curves, then it is also part of the upper envelope of the inverse demand curves (and vice versa).
Thus, Lemma 1 immediately implies:
Proposition 2 When each variety i ∈ N has an inverse demand function Pi (q) = αi− βiη (q), as
implied by the general Mussa-Rosen framework, the equilibrium product line M chooses is the same
as the first-best socially optimal product line.
This situation is graphically illustrated in Figure 3 below. Proposition 2 does not mean that
consumers will purchase their first-best varieties in equilibrium. Since M will optimally segment the
market, it will have to leave some informational surplus to high-valuation consumers. Therefore,
not all consumers will end up consuming the varieties that are socially best for them.
4 Cournot oligopoly
The framework we have built for monopoly above extends very easily to a symmetric Cournot
oligopoly. Suppose there are m identical firms. Similar to the monopoly notation, denote by qji
the cumulative amount of varieties 1, ..., i that firm j sells. We now introduce a new notation Qi,
which aggregates qji across firms; i.e., Qi = Σ
m
j=1q
j
i . Also, denote the symmetric Cournot residual
marginal revenue by SMRi (Q;m). We present the main result in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For a given set of available varieties N = {1, 2, ..., n}, m symmetric Cournot
oligopolists will include variety i in their product lines if and only if
SMRi (Q;m) > max
j 6=i
SMRj (Q;m) for some Q ∈
(
0, SMR−1i (0)
)
,
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Upper envelope of demand curves vs. MR curves 
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where SMRi (Q;m) = Pi (Q) + QP
′
i (Q) /m. Quantities and prices will be given by analogy to
Proposition 1. When each variety i ∈ N has an inverse demand function in the form Pi (q) =
αi − βiη (q), as implied by the general Mussa-Rosen framework, the equilibrium product line under
symmetric Cournot oligopoly is the same as the first-best socially optimal product line.
Once again, equilibrium product line and consumer allocation will be determined by the upper
envelope of the symmetric Cournot marginal revenue curves, with the corresponding prices given
by the incentive compatibility conditions. These are precisely the same steps we followed to obtain
the monopoly outcome, just adjusted for the number of firms. Moreover, the inverse demand form
(6) again implies that the equilibrium and socially optimal product lines are the same (see the
proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix, which shows that SMR curves intersect at the same height as
do the demand curves for an m-firm Cournot oligopoly).
The effects of introducing a new variety can also be tracked as above and as in Johnson and My-
att (2014). Consider a new variety (variety j.5) with a Cournot marginal revenue curve in the prox-
imity where SMRj (Q;m) and SMRj+1 (Q;m) intersect. Then: (i) quantitiesQ1, ..., Qj−1, Qj+1, ..., Qn
will stay unaffected; (ii) prices pj+1, ..., pn will stay unaffected; (iii) Suppose pj changes by an
amount ∆. Then p1, ..., pj−1 change in the same direction, also by ∆.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a monopolist’s choice of its product line. Even though this is generally
a complex problem, we are able to reach very clean results. In particular, we show that the
monopolist’s product line choice problem reduces to including those varieties that are part of
the upper envelope of the net marginal revenue curves. The equilibrium quantities of the included
varieties are then determined by finding where the associated marginal revenue curves cross. We also
show that, for an important class of preferences, the monopolist offers only those product designs
that are (first-best) socially desirable. However, since the monopolist will optimally segment the
market to maximize its profits, there will be distortions in consumption, so consumers will not
always get the variety that is best for them. We also show that these results smoothly extend to a
symmetric Cournot oligopoly framework.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose Pi (q) = Pj (q) = φ for some q. Then αi − βiη (q) = αj − βjη (q) at
such q, and thus η (q) =
αi−αj
βi−βj . Plugging this back into Pi (q), we have
φ = αi − βiαi − αj
βi − βj .
Marginal revenue curve MRi (q) is given by αi−βi (η (q) + qη′ (q)). If MRi (q˜) = MRj (q˜) for some
q˜, then it must be that
η (q˜) + q˜η′ (q˜) =
αi − αj
βi − βj .
Plugging this back into MRi (q), we get
MRi (q) = αi − βiαi − αj
βi − βj = φ.
Thus marginal revenue curves always cross at the same height as the inverse demand curves.
Note that the same arguments also apply to a Cournot oligopoly with m firms, where we define
SMRi (Q;m) = Pi (Q) +QP
′
i (Q) /m = αi − βi
(
η (Q) +Qη′ (Q) /m
)
.
If SMRi(Q˜,m) = SMRj(Q˜,m) for some Q˜, it must be that η(Q˜) +
Q˜η′(Q˜)
m =
αi−αj
βi−βj ,implying
SMRi(Q˜,m) = SMRj(Q˜,m) = αi − βiαi − αj
βi − βj .
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Hence, the same property extends to a symmetric m-firm oligopoly.
Proof of Proposition 3. Take each firm’s behavior as given and analyze firm k in isolation. For
given prices (p1, ..., pn), we can express firm k’s profits as
pik = (p1 − p2) qk1 + · · ·+ pnqkn.
The incentive compatibility constraints are now given by:
Pi (Qi)− pi = Pi+1 (Qi)− pi+1, for i = 1, ..., n− 1,
Pn (Qn)− pn = 0.
Incorporating these into the profit function, we can express profits as a function of quantities only:
pik = (P1 (Q1)− P2 (Q1)) qk1 + (P2 (Q2)− P3 (Q2)) qk2 + · · ·+ Pn (Qn) qkn.
Let SMRi (Q;m) = Pi (Q)+QP
′
i (Q) /m denote the symmetric Cournot residual marginal revenue.
Then, in an interior equilibrium with qki = Qi/m, we reach the following first-order conditions:
SMRi (Qi;m) = SMRi+1 (Qi;m) , for i = 1, ..., n− 1,
SMRn (Qn;m) = 0.
We now argue that any variety in the upper envelope of the SMR curves will be produced in
equilibrium. To see this, suppose that varieties 1 and 2 are produced, with switch-point Q1, but
that variety 1.5 has a higher SMR at Q1 (the argument applies for any variety). Without variety
1.5, profit is as above. Suppose now that firm k produces ∆qk1 units less of variety 1 and substitutes
with ∆qk1 units of variety 1.5. So then,
pik =
(
P1
(
Q1 −∆qk1
)
− P1.5
(
Q1 −∆qk1
))(
qk1 −∆qk1
)
+ (P1.5 (Q1)− P2 (Q1)) qk1
+ (P2 (Q2)− P3 (Q2)) qk2 + · · ·+ Pn (Qn) qkn.
The change in profit is the difference
∆pik =
{(
P1
(
Q1 −∆qk1
)
− P1.5
(
Q1 −∆qk1
))(
qk1 −∆qk1
)
+ P1.5 (Q1) q
k
1
}
− P1 (Q1) qk1 .
We can rewrite this expression as
∆pik
∆qk1
=
P1(Q1−∆qk1)−P1(Q1)
∆qk1
qk1 − P1
(
Q1 −∆qk1
)− P1.5(Q1−∆qk1)−P1.5(Q1)
∆qk1
qk1 + P1.5
(
Q1 −∆qk1
)
.
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In the limit as ∆qk1 → 0, this becomes
pi′k = −P ′1 (Q1) qk1 − P1 (Q1) + P ′1.5 (Q1) qk1 + P1.5 (Q1)
= SMR1.5 (Q1;m)− SMR1 (Q1;m) ,
where the last line follows from evaluating at qk1 = Q1/m. Thus, profit is higher if the putatively
excluded variety is produced. A similar argument shows that any variety whose SMR lies below
the upper envelope of the SMR curves will not be produced by any firm because it will not be
profitable even if the rivals produce none of it.
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